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SUSPENSE

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Remarks

Executive Secretary

5 DEC 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY  
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-6000

FROM:

*Col Rich Linn*

DATE:

*11/29*

TO:

[Redacted box]

STAT

*Please use the attached syllabus  
of my course as you see fit to  
help prepare Mr. McMahon for  
his presentation on December 17,  
Tuesday, at 0830.*

*Thank you*

*Rich Linn*



*T-111*


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
UNIT IV: THE AMERICAN POLICYMAKING PROCESS

COURSE TWO: POLICY PLANNING AND NATIONAL  
SECURITY DECISIONMAKING

ACADEMIC YEAR 1985-1986



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Course Director



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Public Policy

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to promote discussion by students of the  
National War College. It does not necessarily  
reflect the views of the National Defense University  
or the Department of Defense.

**POLICY PLANNING AND NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING**

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| <b>Topic 1</b>  | <b>(LD)</b>      | <b>Overview and Framework for Analysis of Policymaking in the Executive Branch</b>            |
| <b>Topic 2</b>  | <b>(L)</b>       | <b>Role of the Assistant to the President for for National Security Affairs</b>               |
| <b>Topic 3A</b> | <b>(L&amp;D)</b> | <b>Structure of the NSC and the Work of the NSC Staff</b>                                     |
| <b>Topic 3B</b> | <b>(DR)</b>      | <b>National Security Council</b>  |
| <b>Topic 3C</b> | <b>(IS)</b>      | <b>Discussion of the NSC and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</b> |
| <b>Topic 4A</b> | <b>(DR)</b>      | <b>Department of Defense</b>  |
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| <b>Topic 5</b>  | <b>(L)</b>       | <b>Analysis Support and the Role of the Budget in DOD Decisionmaking</b>                      |
| <b>Topic 6A</b> | <b>(DR)</b>      | <b>Policymaking in the State Department</b>   |
| <b>Topic 6B</b> | <b>(LD)</b>      | <b>Issues Confronting the State Department</b>  |
| <b>Topic 7A</b> | <b>(DR)</b>      | <b>The Intelligence Community</b>   |
| <b>Topic 7B</b> | <b>(LD)</b>      | <b>Intelligence and the Role of the DCI</b>   |
| <b>Topic 8A</b> | <b>(DR)</b>      | <b>Vietnam Case Study Preparation</b>   |
| <b>Topic 8B</b> | <b>(SE)</b>      | <b>Vietnam: Case Study in Decisionmaking</b>  |
| <b>Topic 9</b>  | <b>(DR)</b>      | <b>DOD, the JCS, Congress and Reorganization</b>  |
| <b>Topic 10</b> | <b>(LD)</b>      | <b>Providing Military Advice and the Role of the JCS in National Security Decisionmaking</b>  |
| <b>Topic 11</b> | <b>(L)</b>       | <b>Contemporary Perspective on National Security Issues</b>                                   |

## OVERVIEW

You have just completed Course 1 of Unit IV, one of the most fundamental and interesting blocs of instruction in the core curriculum. As a result, you should be sensitive to the impact of the American political environment upon the federal policymaking process and the interactions of the major institutions of government. This course will focus more directly upon the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government and will help you better understand the elements and processes of policy planning and national security decisionmaking. In conjunction with the other parts of the core curriculum, this course will try, in a modest way, to assist in developing your ability to address and analyze important national security issues and to formulate realistic solutions to the problems they pose.

First, we will focus on the highest and ultimately final level of national security decisionmaking--the Presidential level. We will consider the national security system established for Presidents to use, and how Presidents use that system. How does the President view and receive advice from his National Security Council? What kind of arrangements can be made to ensure timely and quality advice to facilitate foreign policy and national security decisions? What is the role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the staff of the National Security Council that supports him?

Secondly, the course will address the roles of the major executive agencies which input to and partake in the national security decisionmaking system: the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community. Each brings to the process a certain perspective unique to themselves because of their institutional responsibilities and because of the nature of their leadership. We need to be aware of these differences as we deal in the decisionmaking process because of the subsequent impact upon policy developments. We must be sophisticated enough to see the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these unique perspectives so as to realistically appraise recommendations for organizational change--to know when reform will be meaningful, when it will have an impact upon policy, and when it will just be a different cover for doing business the same old way.

In the area of defense, we will take a quick look into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This is one of the largest and most structured decisionmaking tools of any government agency in the U.S. or in the world for that matter, and its effect on defense issues and decisions is commensurately large. We will receive a presentation on analysis support for the SECDEF and the role of the budget in DOD decisionmaking.

Next we will look more into the nuts and bolts of the process. By dissecting some very important decisions that led to expansion of the Vietnam War, we will observe first hand the interactive process of the agencies as they approached some of the most crucial national security decisions this country faced in the 1960s.

Finally, we will look at the way the President and the SECDEF receive advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), evaluate the effectiveness of the JCS system and examine some proposals for JCS reform.

A special opportunity to overview policymaking in the Executive Branch and to gain a contemporary perspective on national security issues will form the last course meeting with a review by Alexander Haig. This will be followed by Q&A, and capped off with a pre-holiday festivity.

The course is a combination of readings, lectures, panel discussions, and seminar sessions designed to give you background on the dynamics of the national security decisionmaking process so that you can focus on the critical issues of how to understand and work within the system, and how best to organize and plan in the future for better results.

The lecturers are, for the most part, current implementors of the system. They have all had government experience. You should use the question and answer periods with them to maximum benefit. Probe their perspectives and insights to understand how the process worked for them in practice, and to learn what opportunities and constraints exist for improvement through change. Challenge the assumptions of the guest lecturers and ask them penetrating questions in areas you feel they have not been sufficiently clear or vigorous during their presentations.

In one form or another, you will all be entering the national security community following graduation from NWC, and it is just possible that you may be working for or with some of the people who will have addressed you during the course. In any event, you will be working within that thing called "The National Security Decisionmaking Process," and we hope this program of instruction will leave you better prepared for the task.

#### Acknowledgements

The Course Director would like to give special thanks to Johanna deOnis for timely library assistance and to Sue O'Keefe and Linda Welling for syllabus preparation and administrative support.



## Topic 1: Overview and Framework for Analysis of Policymaking in the Executive Branch

Monday

9 December 1985

0830-0945

LD

### A. General:

The lecture will give an overview to the course and explain its relationship to the rest of the NWC core program--where you have been to date, and where you are headed following the Christmas break. It will also focus on how national security policy is formulated and implemented in the Executive Branch. We will address the importance of a framework for looking at this process if we are to better understand and work within it.

Policymakers are faced with constraints arising from the American cultural tradition, the dispersion of political power, and the complex bureaucratic relationships of large organizations. The President, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence are the major agents in the environment. We will need to develop an individual framework for analyzing how they and their organizations play in the process.

The first reading from the NDU book on national security policy is a very simplified introduction to some of the theories espoused by experts and scholars on how the "system" works. They are attempts to bring order to what may otherwise be chaos and confusion. The purpose of exposing you to these ideas is not to destroy your mind, or to cause you confusion with the complexity of the theory and problems. Rather, it is to let you know: (1) that there are different ways of looking at the process, (2) that theory and models are abstractions from reality designed to help you understand the real world, (3) that it is near to impossible to begin to discuss these issues without some framework for analysis, and (4) that the framework you adopt should be the one which best helps you understand the process.

The second reading, "A Bureaucratic Perspective," delves a little deeper into one of the theories; one which the authors believe is "useful and fruitful." But, as Halperin and Kanter concede, "the experts cannot agree on what constitutes the most fruitful level of analysis nor where best to look for the answers." Don't get hung up on the abstractions. Use them as you see fit to help you explain how and why policies and decisions are made in the U.S.

### B. Issues for Consideration:

1. As you reflect upon the various conceptual approaches to the policy process, which of them seems most descriptive of the real world that you have come to know? What practical experiences have you where that approach explained the outcome of a decisionmaking problem or issue?

2. Do you believe the rational actor model is descriptive of the American policymaking and decisionmaking process? What examples do you have where this approach was clearly working as a basis for decisionmaking?

3. Mr. Jack Valenti (of moviemaking fame) was a close associate and adviser of both President Kennedy and President Johnson. I once heard him remark that each step, each decision that was taken during Vietnam at the presidential level, seemed like it was exactly the right decision at the time. Think about that in light of the models described and try to come to a conclusion as to what his remark really said and why, in the end, those decisions did not result in victory.

4. Do you view the various approaches as mutually exclusive explanations of the process, as competing with each other for dominance, or is it possible that some of the approaches are complementary and can occur simultaneously?

C. Required Readings:

a. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 139-146.

b. Halperin, Morton H., and Arnold Kanter, Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973, pp. 1-42.

## Topic 2: Role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Monday

9 December 1985

1000-1130

L

### INTRODUCTION

The United States emerged as a world power in the twentieth century without a tradition of sophisticated statecraft. World War II forced an amalgam of organizational innovations--some created, some borrowed--to deal with the urgent needs of national security policy formulation and implementation. All were essentially ad hoc. At the end of World War II, critics of the costly blunders and gross inefficiencies due to lack of organization clamored for structure to support our national security affairs. Some were fearful of the autonomy that the President possessed in the ad hoc world, and some were concerned for the future course of events of a nation now clearly identified as a leader on the world scene.

The result of these various pressures was the National Security Act of 1947, which remains the statutory basis of the organization for national security in the United States. The 1947 Act was a product of the American political system. It was a package of compromises hammered out between competing agencies such as the emergent Air Force, which sought an independent status after World War II; the Navy, which battled to strengthen its place in the budget ahead; the Marine Corps, which fought for its very survival as an organization; and the Army, which tried to maintain its leading position. Advisers to the President sought to protect his freedom of action in the 1947 Act.

Fundamentally, the distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches remained the constant concern regardless of how the issues varied. Overriding every issue was the theme of centralization versus decentralization. Congress struggled, in the face of pressure for centralization, to keep power from the executive and in its own branch through ensuring multiple actors and greater decentralization of the national security organization. This bargaining to design the national security structure for the future took place before the full effects of the Cold War and atomic weapons were recognized. The resulting National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments contained these principal initiatives:

1. It established the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body to the President for national security matters.
2. A new cabinet-level agency--the Department of Defense--was established with the Army, Navy and Air Force as co-equal parts of the Department of Defense. The Air Force became a separate military service.
3. The committee of Chiefs of the armed services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was given a statutory basis and designated the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency was created with high-level intelligence functions and coordinating authority.

It should be emphasized that the 1947 Act did not change the Constitutional position of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs and national security matters. Until the Korean War, President Truman did not personally take part in NSC meetings in order to show that neither the President's responsibilities nor his freedom of action were circumscribed by the creation of the National Security Council. The new legislation tended to formalize the layer of national security professionals and establishment, "inners-and-outers,"\* which had developed during World War II to coordinate the politico-military effort of the nation. These persons manned key positions in the new Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council Staff, where they tended to extend the President's reach down into the policymaking structure.

As you see, the fundamentals of this act establish the main areas of interest for this course.

#### A. General:

The Congress established the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." The key word here is "advise."

As a formal committee of the President's senior advisers, the National Security Council usually serves to formalize options and recommendations which have been reached through intragovernmental deliberations. Actual presidential decisions usually have been made prior to NSC meetings or are made by the President in privacy after meeting with his advisers. There are four statutory members of the NSC: The President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence is the principal intelligence adviser. The Chairman, JCS, is the statutory military adviser to the council as the JCS representative. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs attends in his dual roles as Adviser to the President, and as head of the NSC staff. Other senior officials, such as the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of the Treasury; or the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are invited to NSC meetings when the issue to be discussed is related to their responsibilities.

In Washington and in interagency forums, we tend to use the terms "NSC," "NSC meetings" and "NSC structure," in a very loose and overlapping manner.

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\*"Inners-and-outers" is a term used by Professor Richard E. Neustadt to describe appointed noncareer and often nonpolitical officials in government. The United States has a much larger and more influential group of inners-and-outers compared with the major states. The importance of this layer of policymakers, and the fact that it changes character with each change of Administration, is a unique and often overlooked aspect of our system of government.

It is important for you to keep straight in your mind what the NSC is statutorily, and then realize the differences when the term is more loosely applied to the "NSC system."

In the case of the Reagan Administration, the NSC structure has evolved from a Cabinet system with a very strong Secretary of State to one that is more centralized in the White House. The initial interagency process involved three independent groups; one dealing with foreign policy chaired by the Secretary of State; one dealing with defense policy chaired by the Secretary of Defense, and one concerned with intelligence matters chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, the President formed a crisis management team which was chaired by Vice President Bush. With the departure of Richard Allen as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Alexander Haig as the Secretary of State, the Assistant for National Security Affairs and the NSC staff have assumed a more active role as facilitators and coordinators of policy. On certain issues, they have also become advocates of particular policy positions.

This session will allow us to address the position and office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This is your first opportunity to probe a practitioner by asking those penetrating questions on organization and function as well as policy issues and decisions which leave you a little confused as to their rationality (who said decisions had to be rational?).

Most acknowledge that an NSC system will be fashioned to fit the needs of a President. The search by the Reagan administration for stability in the Adviser's position is portrayed by a story of shifting power relationships between personalities, organizations and ideas within the Executive Branch.

#### **B. Issues for Consideration:**

1. In your view what function should the National Security Council serve? Should it provide a forum for advising the President? Should it have a formal and mandatory process in the decisionmaking loop? Should it and its staff be the President's highest level staff for working day to day decisions, plans development, and sometimes decision implementation?

2. Do different presidents and their personalities really have an influence on how the NSC will work?

3. What kind of a Special Assistant to the President would you choose depending upon how you answered question #1, and what duties would you ask him to perform?

4. Do you think the Special Assistant should have the "last" word of advice to the President on national security issues, or should he attempt to be impartial and objective by merely summarizing options?

#### **C. Required Readings:**

a. Destler, I.M., "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons From Thirty Years," World Politics 29 (January 1977): pp. 143-176.

b. Fritz, Sara, with Dennis Mullin and Robert S. Dudley, "The First Shake Up," U.S. News and World Report, January 18, 1982, pp. 16-18.

b. Fritz, Sara, with Dennis Mullin and Robert S. Dudley, "The First Shake Up," U.S. News and World Report, January 18, 1982, pp. 16-18.

Topic 3A:                    Structure of the NSC and the Work of the NSC Staff  
Tuesday  
10 December 1985  
0830-1130  
L&P

Topic 3B:                    The National Security Council  
Tuesday  
10 December 1985  
1330-1630  
DR

Topic 3C:                    Discussion of the NSC and the  
Wednesday                   Assistant to the President for National Security  
11 December 1985           Affairs  
0930-1130  
IS

A. General:

These sessions will continue our inspection into the NSC and the NSC system. Many cogent observers of the national security process believe that the staff of the NSC, much like the staff of Congress, has grown not only in size, but in quality and stature as well. For many young intellectuals, a request to serve as a member of the NSC staff is akin to an invitation from heaven--a prestigious and sought-after opportunity.

On Tuesday, we will have the benefit of hearing from current and previous members of the NSC staff. They have seen and participated in the advising role to the President. This is your opportunity to glean from them some further pieces of the puzzle--pieces that will help you develop an understanding of how the process really works and how closely it aligns with the framework you are adopting to analyze national security decisions in the future.

The readings are designed to bring you through some historical developments and trends of the NSC system and the functions it as well as its personalities have performed. The purpose is to allow you to develop some conclusions of your own regarding the importance of the Council, the value of its advice, its status and the status of the NSC staff today, and what one might expect throughout the remainder of the Reagan Administration as well as what a new administration might bring forth.

B. Issues for Consideration

1. Does it make a difference as to how the NSC is organized for successful policymaking in the Executive Branch?

2. Are there any national security policy issues that should not be the collective responsibility of the NSC but rather the individual responsibility of a cabinet secretary? Why or why not?

3. Presidents Johnson and Carter tended to meet weekly with their Secretaries of State and Defense. They only infrequently met with the NSC as a whole, where the Chairman of the JCS and the DCI, among others, were represented. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such procedures?

4. The Defense Department has called for and chaired very few SIG meetings whereas the State Department has had many on foreign policy issues. Why do you think that is so?

5. From the material in this and other courses as well as your own reading of current events do you detect any trends in power relationships regarding the NSC staff, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other advisers to the President (Cabinet or non-Cabinet). If so, what and why? Who seems to be gaining influence?

6. Is the NSC staff becoming more influential in policy implementation than it has been in the past? If so, why? Is it effective? What are the risks in such a development?

7. Odeen stresses the importance of the institutional functions of the NSC staff, i.e., identifying issues and forcing decisions, managing the inter-agency decision process, and overseeing implementation. Too much emphasis on policy advice and too little on these institutional functions would be a mistake. Do you agree? How do the members of the panel feel on this question? Which aspect of their duties would they rather pursue and why?

8. The following four cases deal with decisions on organizational structure and relationships for national security that confront a president early on in an administration. These cases raise the critical issues which will be addressed during the rest of the course. Use them to form a platform for discussion during your seminar session.

#### Case 1

The formulation of national security policy occurs through an interagency process, with representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence Community, and the NSC staff.

Each new President must set up his own NSC structure and interagency process. The most critical issue has traditionally been to define the role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

(1) What responsibility should the Assistant to the President have in coordinating the national security policymaking process? Should he chair all interagency groups, including the NSC crisis management group? Or, should the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense respectively chair interagency meetings on foreign and defense issues? Whoever is chairman has the obvious advantage of setting the agenda, defining the policy choices, and presenting the results to the President.

(2) How active a role should the Assistant to the President play in the formulation and exposition of U.S. national security policy? Should he:



- include his own recommendations on memos to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense;
- meet with the President each morning to brief him on current intelligence issues;
- give speeches and meet with the press to explain American foreign and defense policies;
- make trips abroad to carry out special diplomatic tasks for the President?

You are currently on the NSC staff. The new President would like your recommendation on these positions and to know what differences his choices will make in terms of policy decisions.

### Case 2

Historically, Presidents at the beginning of their Administration tend to give the Secretary of State responsibility for both defining and implementing U.S. foreign policy. But gradually, the President and his White House and NSC staff have taken over primary responsibility for the substance of U.S. foreign policies.

You are on the staff of the Secretary of State. He has asked you to outline why this happens and what he should do in terms of organizing the State Department so this will not happen to him.

### Case 3

Members of the transition team have catalogued a number of criticisms of the current JCS system. The Chiefs are not able to provide timely and high quality advice; to set aside their parochial biases; to address contentious issues, e.g., roles and missions, and to make recommendations for resource allocations which are inconsistent with their service views. The new President understands that a number of proposals for reform have been made. But first, he wants to know whether these criticisms are fair, and then how any organizational changes could be expected to remedy the problems.

You are currently in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The new Secretary of Defense has asked your views.

### Case 4

The new President wants to organize the intelligence community to make sure that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is the principal spokesman for the intelligence community and that his judgments will be relied on by all the members of the NSC. At the same time, he wants to avoid the biases that tend to arise when intelligence analysts work either for Departments (State and Defense) with policy preferences, or for the CIA which also has the clandestine service operators.

As a member of the intelligence community staff, you have been asked to comment on whether these are the right objectives, whether they can be achieved, and whether organizational changes are required.

C. Required Reading:

Topic 3A: Structure of the NSC and the Work of the NSC Staff

1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes and Issues, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 17-32.
2. Safire, William, "The NSC After Clark," The New York Times, November 29, 1982, p. 19. Reprinted in Current News Main Edition, 29 November 1982.
3. Kirschten, Dick, "Insider Clark Decides Now is the Time to go Public on NSC Policy Issues," National Journal, June 11, 1982, pp. 1217-1220.
4. Gelb, Leslie H., "McFarlane Carving His Niche," The New York Times, March 28, 1984, Section 2, page 10, column 3.
5. Cannon, Lou, "McFarlane's Hidden Hand Guides U.S. Foreign Policy," The Washington Post, February 15, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edition, February 15, 1985, pp. 1F, 2F, and 16F.
6. Morgenthau, Tom, with John Walcott and Margaret Gerrard Warner, "The Crisis Manager: McFarlane Now Faces his Toughest Test," U.S. News and World Report, July 1, 1985, p. 23. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edition, June 25, 1985, p. 11F.
7. Evans, Rowland and Robert Novak, "McFarlane's New Influence," The Washington Post, August 28, 1985, p. 19. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edition, August 29, 1985, p. 2F.
8. "This Bud's on View," Newark Star-Ledger (Editorial), August 27, 1985. Reprinted in Current News Weekend Edition, August 30-September 2, 1985, p. 3E.
9. Omang, Joanne. "McFarlane Aid Facilitates Policy," The Washington Post, August 11, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News Weekend Edition, August 9-11, 1985, pp. 1-2F.
10. Gwertzman, Bernard, "U.S. Calls Hanoi Talks 'Most Positive in 12 Years,'" The New York Times, September 4, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, Early Bird Edition, September 4, 1985, pp. 3-4.

Topic 3B: The National Security Council

1. Rockman, Bert A., "America's Department of State: Irregular and Regular Syndroms of Policy Making," American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, December 1985, pp. 911-927.
2. Odeen, Philip A., "Organizing for National Security," International Security, Summer 1980, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 111-129.

Topic 3C: Discussion of the NSC and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1. Janka, Les, "The National Security Council and the Making of American Middle East Policy," Armed Forces Journal International, March 1984 (16), pp. 84-86.
2. Richburg, Keith B., "CIA Work on Manual Discounted, McFarlane Advocates Firing Any Officials Involved in Primer," The Washington Post, October 22, 1984, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News Morning Edition, October 22, 1984, p. 6.
3. "McFarlane Reassures Latin Allies," The Baltimore Sun, January 21, 1985, p. 2. Reprinted in Current News, January 22, 1985, p. 6.
4. O'Leary, Jeremiah, "U.S. Officer Advises Contra Chiefs," The Washington Times, August 9, 1985, p. 3. Reprinted in Current News, August 9, 1985, p. 7.
5. Boyd, Gerald M., "Role in Nicaragua Described by U.S. Administration Says Contacts With Rebels Were Legal," The New York Times, August 9, 1985, p. 4. Reprinted in Current News, August 9, 1985, p. 7.
6. Cody, Edward, "Leader of Contras Describes Contacts with White House," The Washington Post, August 14, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, August 14, 1985, pp. 3, 9.
7. Williams, Dan, "Contra's Raids Send Message to Managua," Los Angeles Times, August 13, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, August 14, 1985, pp. 9-10.
8. Diaz, Tom, "Post Story Imperils NSC Aide and Family," The Washington Times, August 14, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, August 14, 1985, pp. 3-4.

**Topic 4A: Department of Defense**

**Wednesday**

**11 December 1985**

**1330-1515**

**DR**

**Topic 4B: Policymaking in the Defense Department**

**Thursday**

**12 December 1985**

**0830-1130**

**LD**

**A. General**

The Department of Defense has continued to evolve in size, shape and characteristics since the National Security Act of 1947. Its size today dwarfs other government agencies as well as most corporations in America. Leadership of this mammoth organization has turned out to be an enormous problem. The organization's interactions with other agencies of the federal government and corporate America have created a labyrinth often difficult to penetrate, sometimes impossible to understand, and always a challenge to work within.

Decisionmaking within the Department reflects the environment and nature of our society and government as a whole--where pluralism is the essence of the process and special interest groups prevail but take on names like the Army and Navy, or the R&D community and the force structure people, the operators or the programmers. The first readings try to capture the nature of this competition and the need to understand special relationships that develop between interests as they attempt to influence decisions and outcomes of conflict situations.

A critical issue regarding reorganizations of the national security community has been the trend toward centralization of control over the defense organization--a trend that has been in existence since the 1947 National Security Act. A review of past Secretaries of Defense is provided for background, but the essence of the issue rests in the question posed in the article headed, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make A Difference?" Although there has been a trend to greater centralization of control and leadership within the Secretary's office, it is a fact of life that power in the Defense Department is decentralized, as it is in the rest of the government. The Secretary of Defense has three major responsibilities: (1) to advise the President on the military aspects of national security policy, (2) to act as the President's deputy in the military chain of command; and (3) to manage the Department of Defense. Secretaries of Defense have exhibited different management styles, ranging from the centralized approach of Robert McNamara to the decentralized approach of Melvin Laird. Whatever the style, they must work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services; they do not direct them.

The Chiefs of Staff have individual responsibility for managing their respective services and joint responsibility for providing advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense on national security policies and operational planning. The Chairman of the JCS has no independent power of

decision, but must seek consensus among the service chiefs. He also commands no forces, for that is the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) who report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. But, the CINCs lack complete control over their component service commands which tend to be more responsive to their individual Service Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

This decentralization and sharing of power creates a number of problems. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise their influence primarily by building consensus. Planning for military operations and the preparation of budgets must go through complex and time-consuming procedures. Often, the resulting policies are characterized by compromise and the postponement of difficult issues, particularly with respect to issues affecting service roles and missions.

From this background, we may conclude that the answer to the question "Can the Secretary of Defense make a difference?" lies partly in who that Secretary is, how much of himself he gives to the job of managing the system, and what issues he gives his attention to.

The readings in Topic 5 show where the current Secretary of Defense has elected to concentrate his main attention and that has been on the issue of budgetary increases for the Defense Department to attempt to hold off a growing Soviet threat. In addition, this Secretary has been exceptionally tough on the issue of arms control. The ideas and the main implementer of the ideas behind this hard line arms control approach have resided with a strong Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD/ISP) Mr. Richard Perle. We hope to have Richard Perle address the Class on the topic of policymaking in the Defense Department. This session will prove most helpful in gaining a better insight into the interaction of ideas, organizations and personalities in the decisionmaking process.

#### B. Issues for Consideration:

1. Is it inevitable that decisionmaking within the DOD will be characterized by the pluralistic model? Should the process become more centralized or less centralized? Why?
2. Historically, Secretaries of Defense have resisted any NSC review of defense issues. Should the members of the NSC and their staffs collectively, and on a regular basis, participate in DOD decisions on force disposition, weapons acquisition, and force structure decisions?
3. In the area of arms control, how is it possible that members of the military within DOD can appear to be more supportive of a major SALT agreement and members of the civilian community within DOD can appear to be more opposed?
4. Can a Secretary of Defense, as an individual really make a difference in regard to military service policies, weapons acquisition, and budget expenditures or is he at the mercy of the "process" and the "system"? What issues are more conducive to centralized control by the SECDEF?

**C. Required Readings:**

**Topic 4A: Department of Defense**

1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 51-86.

2. Lynn, Laurence E. and Richard I. Smith, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make A Difference,?" International Security 7 (Summer 1982): pp. 45-69.

3. Bauer, Theodore W. and Harry B. Yoshpe, "Unity or Confederation," In American Defense Policy, Fourth Edition, pp. 258-264, edited by John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.

**Topic 4B: Policymaking in the Defense Department**

1. Hiatt, Fred, "Perle's Distrust Shapes U.S. Policy," The Washington Post, January 2, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, January 2, 1985, pp. 1, 2, 7, and 8.

2. Hiatt, Fred, "A Richard Perle Sampler," The Washington Post, January 2, 1985, p. 20. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, January 2, 1985, p. 7.

3. Wilson, George C., "Adviser's Conflict on Salt II," The Washington Post, June 4, 1985, p. 20. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, June 4, 1985, pp. 1, 2, 8.

4. Cannon, Lou, "Dismantling of Sub Opposed by Advisers," The Washington Post, June 4, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, June 4, 1985, pp. 1, 2, 8.

**D. Supplementary Reading:**

Almanac, Defense 85, September 1985. (Separate student issue earlier this year), skim for overview of Defense Department.

**Topic 5: Analysis Support and the Role of the Budget  
in DOD Decisionmaking**

Friday  
13 December 1985  
0830-1000

**A. General:**

In all phases of decisionmaking, analysis of some sort is a fundamental prerequisite. It can help in defining issues, analyzing the issues, and eventually selecting from options, i.e., making the actual decision. The Secretary of Defense has within his organization a Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). Depending upon the nature of the issue and the timing of a decision, this Director can be a most influential participant in the decisionmaking process especially regarding budgetary decisions and other programmatic issues.

We have today an opportunity to hear from the Director (PA&E), Dr. David Chu. His presentation on the nature and importance of his function and his relationship to other members of the OSD staff, the services and the Joint Staff should help shed some light on the decentralized nature of the decisionmaking process within the DOD.

You should take the opportunity to ask some very direct questions of Dr. Chu particularly regarding the PPBS and how he relates to such activities as the Defense Resources Board (DRB) meetings. He has a unique perspective on most of the issues in DOD decisionmaking. We will not address the specifics of how military weapons systems are acquired during this course (the separate management process for DOD decisions on the acquisition of major weapons systems is the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) process). However, you may want to ask how Dr. Chu's office relates to the Office of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering (USDR&E) on those issues. USDR&E provides the necessary cost, testing and production schedules and performance factors to make decisions on individual weapons.

We have already looked at the budget process from the congressional standpoint and have found it extremely complicated. One wonders how any resultant could possibly conform to some larger plan or strategy. Indeed, the amounts of budget authority, appropriation and outlay are significant influences upon our current and future capability. We have mentioned how Secretary Weinberger has pushed for increases in the defense budget, and commented on how successful he has been in getting increases approved because of his tenacity. However, it helps to look somewhat closer at the figures to understand all that was sought certainly has not been achieved, and how the PPBS is constantly bubbling in efforts to make adjustments to reality vice plans.

A historical look at the five year defense expenditure plan in 1981 shows that by FY86 the difference between plan and reality was in excess of \$150 billion. As this syllabus is prepared, the Defense Department is operating on a continuing resolution, but it appears that the FY86 authorization and appropriation will total around \$300 billion. This figure is \$10 billion less than was requested for FY1985.

The picture for the next five years portrays a continuation of the trend that has been in effect since 1981--more for defense, but nowhere near the amount that was anticipated or planned for. Some in the Pentagon believe the actual cuts over the next five year period will exceed \$400 billion from April 1985 planned expenditures. The following chart shows OMB estimates of the differences.

MORNING, 17 SEPTEMBER 1985

**PENTAGON FUNDING**  
**White House Estimates of Money Available**  
**for President Reagan's Rearmament Program**  
**(in Billions of Dollars)**

| FISCAL       | APRIL 1985     | SEPT. 1985     | CUT          |
|--------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| '86          | \$313.7        | \$294.3        | \$19.4       |
| '87          | 354.0          | 314.7          | 39.3         |
| '88          | 401.6          | 337.5          | 64.1         |
| '89          | 438.8          | 361.5          | 77.3         |
| '90          | 477.7          | 386.8          | 90.9         |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>1.985.8</b> | <b>1.694.8</b> | <b>291.0</b> |

SOURCE: OMB Mid-Session Review, FY '86

If you think you are having trouble running your household budget, you can believe the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries and chiefs are having trouble running theirs as well. Some of the implications of these trends are self-evident and materialize quickly, e.g., cancellation of the AF T-46A trainer jet and HH60 Blackhawk helicopter for special operations, cancellation of DIVAD gun system, reduction in M-X missile (peacekeeper) planned production, and a close look at many other programs (anti-satellite systems, ammunition and spare parts, composition of 600 ship Navy (less cruisers/destroyers), JYX assault aircraft for Marines, etc.) But the larger issues are more perplexing, more enduring, and more serious and they involve the impact upon our national and military strategies.

**B. Issues for Consideration.**

1. Each service submits a budget request to the Secretary of Defense in the form of a Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The defense guidance is designed to set the conceptual framework (strategy and policies) and fiscal restrictions for these POMs. How can POMs possibly make any sense from a strategic standpoint if they are not integrated during preparation and before submission to SECDEF? What is the role of the OSD staff to help the Secretary of Defense determine what is the best mix of programs from each service? Should the Secretary ask his staff for this help and information? Should he ask the Chairman of the JCS?



2. The FY85 POM inputs to the FY85 DOD budget were well in excess of \$300 billion. The President requested \$305 billion from Congress. The Congress eventually granted approximately \$290 billion to DOD for FY85. The facts on decreased amounts for defense are further highlighted in the syllabus and readings. What do these reductions mean for the whole PPBS? Will these reduced monies have an impact on our strategy? Should they? Or does the old cliché, "a billion here a billion there, soon (but not yet) we will be talking about real money," have a ring of truth in this process?

C. Required Readings:

1. Bellinger, John, "Strategic Planning and Decisionmaking in the Defense Department," September 1985. (An unpublished paper)

2. Philpott, Tom, "Budget Debate Culminates Five Step Process," Air Force Times, February 13, 1984, p. 12.

3. Hoffman, David, "Reagan Backs \$305 Billion Defense Request," The Washington Post, December 14, 1983, p. 4. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, December 14, 1983, pp. 1-2.

4. Carrington, Tim and Jane Mayer, "Weinberger Said to Seek \$333.7 Billion for Defense in '86, Overruling Joint Chiefs," Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1984, p. 2. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, November 28, 1984, pp. 1-2.

5. "Defense \$\$: Stockman v. Weinberger," Special for USA Today, USA Today November 29, 1984, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edition, November 29, 1984, pp. 1-2.

6. "Weinberger Balks on Budget Cuts," Special for USA Today, USA Today, December 11, 1984, p. 5. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edition, December 11, 1984, p. 2-F.

7. Carrington, Tim, "Weinberger Finds His Well-Worn Strategies Always Succeed in Blunting Defense Budget Ax," Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1985, p. 48. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, March 1, 1985, pp. 1-2.

8. Keller, Bill, "Weinberger Under Political Siege, But Few Expect Change of Course," New York Times, July 23, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, July 23, 1985, pp. 1, 2, 8.

9. Wilson, George C., "Separate Vote Set on Defense Trims House Liberals Press for \$10 Billion Reduction for Pentagon," The Washington Post, p. 8. Reprinted in Current News, September 6, 1985, pp. 1-2.

10. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1984, pp. 5-3, 5-6 thru 5-11. (Separate student issue)

Topic 6A: Policymaking in the State Department

Friday

13 December 1985

1330-1630

DR

Topic 6B: Issues Confronting the State Department

Monday

16 December 1985

0830-1130

LD

A. General:

We turn our attention now to the role of the Department of State. As an entity of government within the Executive Branch, it is one of the oldest, most influential and well known institutions around the world. The readings provide excellent background material on the historical evolution of the Department and its "official" relationship with some of the other agencies of the "foreign policy machinery."

Bulletins from the Department of State inform that "as chief foreign policy adviser and spokesman, the Secretary of State is responsible for executing the President's policies." Also, they go on to say, "Day-to-day work of implementing foreign policy is done in the United States by the Department of State and abroad through its diplomatic and consular missions."

We have already been exposed to some who tend to challenge the reality of these mission statements. Graham and Szanton address this issue and highlight the continued complaints by the State department that, "extraneous actors were crowding the foreign policy stage." The authors argue that speed of travel and communications has shifted the primary role of major foreign policy direction to Washington D:C. and to the White House. They propose a major role of "Advocacy" to the Department of State, i.e., arguing at every stage that the interests of the U.S. would be "most reliably advanced by policies and actions that meet the legitimate requirements of all nations." This argument is supported by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Power and Principle (pp. 533-535) where he argues that:

As the United States moves into the twenty-first century, with its global involvement so intense and so central to our national survival, the nerve center for national security is bound to be increasingly the White House....In addition, Secretaries of State....tend to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy. What they forget is that diplomacy is a technique for promoting national objectives abroad and not an end in itself.

One of the larger questions in the area of national security and foreign policy is the determination of the spokesman within the administration for these areas. The President is and should be the ultimate determiner of the positions and policy we adopt. However, whose policy is it when it is announced or delivered by the SecState or SecDef or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the White House Press Secretary or

a lesser member of the Executive Branch. When Secretary Weinberger visits a country, as he did Egypt in 1984 to discuss the Middle East peace process and U.S. military aid, or Tunisia where he promotes that nation for standing up to neighboring Libya and promises continued military support, is he taking away a role and function of foreign policy from State?

One must conclude that there is no inherent simple separation of interests or responsibilities between Defense and State when an issue comes to overseas commitments. Every foreign policy for which the Secretary of State is responsible has a defense aspect, and, every defense policy for which the Secretary of Defense is responsible, has foreign policy implications--it is next to impossible to define clearly their unique responsibilities and therein lies the reason for the frequent competition and the need for cooperation between the two.

Within the Department of State there are ample examples of pulls and tugs of personalities, professionals and politicians, agencies and offices vying for influence and predominance of their ideas regarding foreign policy. The bargaining, compromising and negotiating that takes place in the Department can be as dynamic and intense as that between the cabinet departments and agencies and, as Rubin concludes in Secrets of State, the variety of perspectives that the intradepartmental strains allow are useful to the overall process of decisionmaking. Some recent examples of discord are reflected in the comments of Ambassador Galbraith, Ambassador Funderburk and Secretary Shultz presented in the readings.

#### B. Issues for Consideration:

1. Should the Department of State have major responsibility for defining, coordinating, and/or implementing U.S. foreign policy? In what way, if any, should it be subservient to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs?

2. As Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger served not only as the implementer of the President's foreign policy but also as its architect. Is his a unique case, given his previous role as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs? Should the President realistically expect the Secretary of State to do both?

3. Is it inevitable that there will always be conflict between the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs? If so, is the critical issue then who becomes the public spokesman for U.S. foreign policy?

4. Should the Secretary of State assume the role of "Vicar" in the area of foreign policy as Secretary Haig believed he should?

5. How can cooperation between the Department of State and Department of Defense be enhanced to allow for more coherent U.S. foreign policy?

6. How should the Department of State be organized to best carry out its responsibilities?

7. Is there a need for political appointees as Ambassadors or should all Ambassador positions be filled from career diplomats within the State Department? Why?

C. Required Readings:

Topic 6A: Policymaking in the State Department

1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 33-50.

2. Allison, Graham, and Szanton, Peter, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976, pp. 120-140.

3. Rubin, Barry, Secrets of State, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 232-249.

Topic 6B: Issues Confronting the State Department

1. Hiatt, Fred, "Weinberger Pays Visit to Egypt," The Washington Post, October 14, 1984, p. A22.

2. Oberdorfer, Don, "Schultz Firmly in Command," The Washington Post, February 8, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, February 8, 1985, pp. 8F, 9F.

3. Vinocur, John, "Ambassador Galbraith: Adieu to All That," The New York Times, February 13, 1985, p. A24.

4. "Schultz Takes Issue With Envoy's Comments," The New York Times, February 14, 1985, p. 7. (Special to the New York Times). Reprinted in Current News, Part II, February 14, 1985, p. 4.

5. Graham, Bradley, "Envoy Quits, Faults Policy," The Washington Post, May 15, 1985, pp. A1, A28.

D. Supplementary Readings:

1. "The Department of State Today," March 1984, United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Public Information Series. (Separate student issue)

2. "A Short History of the Department of State, 1781-1981," Bulletin Reprint. (Separate student issue)

Topic 7A: The Intelligence Community

Monday

16 December 1985

1330-1630

DR

Topic 7B: Intelligence and the Role of the DCI

Tuesday

17 December 1985

0830-1130

LD

A. General:

In this topic, we bring our attention to the intelligence community, the quality of the intelligence product, and the role of the Director of Central Intelligence in the national security decisionmaking process.

The intelligence community is very little understood by almost all of those who do not work within the national security community and most of those who do. It is a complex set of organizations, individuals, and responsibilities which, as is the case with the rest of governmental bureaucracy, compete and cooperate in an effort to provide a product called "intelligence" that can factor into national security decisions.

The topic of intelligence is deep, often technical and far too complex for us to learn in detail. However, it is important that we gain an appreciation for its complexity and improve our understanding of the parts and the process if we are to be effective in using the product.

"Good intelligence" is considered by everyone as a critical element that must be available to our national leaders if we are to ensure accurate and successful policy and decisions in the national security field. What are the positive factors that help to make "good intelligence" a reality? What are the negative factors that detract from making "good intelligence" possible.

There is no shortage of critics who are willing to expose faults and failures of the intelligence community. Intelligence failures are fair game for the media and scholars alike. The critics are many, particularly in hindsight following some major policy failures in the international environment that affect our national security, e. g., the fall of the Shah in Iran, the subsequent loss of an important ally, and the substitution of a tyrannical regime with interests opposed to those of the United States. But can such policy failures necessarily be construed as intelligence failures?

Many of the criticisms should be viewed with caution. Why? Because often critics are uninformed or inaccurate in their analysis of an event. Many critics do not or cannot get access to all the information needed to draw accurate conclusions. Some others only use the information that fits the argument they wish to make. On the other hand, there are cases of legitimate failures in the intelligence system and it is appropriate that we ask the question, why they occur and how they can be avoided.

Critics charge, in particular, that the complex and time-consuming interagency process by which the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are written and coordinated smothers competing judgments and hides the existence of gaps in information. The interagency process normally includes representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Military Services Intelligence Staffs, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

With respect to the role of the DCI, he has a variety of difficult and sometimes conflicting responsibilities: to produce "national" intelligence for the President and the NSC, to coordinate the intelligence activities of the various government departments, to serve as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser, and to manage the CIA. To carry out these responsibilities, he must depend ultimately on the personal support of the President. The Secretaries of State and Defense have steadfastly opposed centralized management of intelligence, and the DCI must be forceful to ensure his position is upheld. The DCI prepares the national intelligence budget and reviews the intelligence programs of the various Departments and Agencies. But he does not actually control any part of the intelligence community budget except for the CIA. He commands only the analysts in CIA and the collection assets of the Clandestine Service. Finally, the DCI confronts a potential conflict of interest between his role as DCI and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Having said all of the above, it is important to keep the degree of the problem in perspective. We draw on a useful piece of research and analysis by Mark Lowenthal to help us do that as he addresses the "Burdensome Concept of Failure." We would be wise to be cautious of our criticisms of intelligence. Before we jump on the band wagon of fingerpointing towards failures and giving up on the community's ability to do a good job of providing timely intelligence, we should reappraise our own position and become active in helping the process. One wonders at times if our expectations for the intelligence system may be too high. In any event, it is far better to focus on what we can do to request from the intelligence community that information which would best help us to do our job, to not overload the "system" with unnecessary superfluous requests for intelligence, and to face the reality that even if there is perfect intelligence, the politics of the situation or larger issues may preclude its being widely shared or used.

## **B. Issues for Consideration:**

1. What should the President expect from the intelligence community in terms of information, warning, and predictions? Time and again, first intelligence reports during a crisis are fragmentary and confusing. The Korean airline incident in the summer of 1983 appears to be a case in point. "Should the President and the NSC expect anything different? Does this argue against any public statements being made by senior officials for the first 24 hours of a crisis situation? Would this abdicate their responsibilities to the press?

2. How can we improve the quality and timeliness of the products of the intelligence community? Should organizational changes be made, e.g., through:

--the establishment of a single analytical agency which would bring together the analysis from CIA, DIA, and INR;

--the delegation of responsibility for producing separate estimates to CIA and DIA, each using all the intelligence sources but neither coordinating with the other?

3. Can the DCI ensure that the intelligence community judgments are in fact objective and independent of the policy preferences of the President and the Department of State and Defense?

4. Often NSC principals make and implement policies based on different intelligence information supplied by their own intelligence agencies. Should something be done to consolidate the information early in a crisis? How should it be coordinated for longer range planning so that it does not get watered down?

C. Required Readings:

Topic 7A: The Intelligence Community

1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 87-110.

2. Flanagan, Stephen J., "Managing the Intelligence Community," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1, Summer 1985, pp. 58-95.

Topic 7B: Intelligence and the Role of the DCI

Lowenthal, Mark W., "The Burdensome Concept of Failure," Address before the USAF Academy, 16 pp.

D. Supplementary Reading:

CIA Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency. (Separate student issue).

Topic 8A: Vietnam Case Study Preparation

Tuesday  
17 December 1985  
1330-1630  
DR

Topic 8B: Vietnam: Case Study In Decisionmaking

Wednesday  
18 December 1985  
0830-1130  
SE

A. General:

The directed reading assignment is designed to prepare you for the Vietnam case study/student exercise to be held on Wednesday, 18 December, Topic 8B. The objective of the case study/exercise is to analyze the process by which the United States decided in 1965 to bomb North Vietnam and to commit combat troops.

Students will be given individual responsibility for focusing their readings and research on certain actors in the policymaking process. This will facilitate discussion during the exercise. Try to analyze the decisions from the perspective of the actor's ideas, their personalities, and the organizations they represented. See if this approach can help you understand their various views. Compare them with others, and come to some judgment as to why the decisions were taken.

B. Readings:

The main readings are taken from The Pentagon Papers. Although these documents are a rich source of information, they do not provide a complete picture of the decisionmaking process. From them, nevertheless, you should be able to gain a sense of the views and roles of the major actors.

The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times. Written by Neil Sheehan, Hendrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy and Fox Butterfield. "The Consensus to Bomb North Vietnam: August, 1964 - February, 1965," pp. 315-393. "The Launching of the Ground War: March-July 1965." pp. 394-458. The New York Times, 1971.

The Senator Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers, Vol. III. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Documents 221, 240, 241, pp. 596-598, 651-666.

C. Case Study:

This case study will allow the seminar to look into the decisions in 1965 to bomb North Vietnam and to commit US combat troops. How well did the



process work? How important was the process in determining the policies which emerged?

This session will be conducted as a discussion period with students ready and prepared to introduce the views of their designated actor as the discussion moves through late 1964 and the beginning of 1965. As a student exercise; the students are expected to put themselves into the position and mind of the individual/agency they have been tasked to represent. In so doing, they should be able to convey in the seminar environment not only what their position on each issue was at the time, but why they adopted that position. What were the major influencing factors is the question at hand, and it should be analyzed and answered in terms of a framework which the student has found most useful to him/her.

Students in the seminar will be divided into teams with responsibility for the views of one of the seven major actors in the policymaking process:

- (1) President Johnson
- (2) Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and other Members of the State Department
- (3) Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, and other members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
- (4) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chairman
- (5) the Embassy in Saigon
- (6) the Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy
- (7) the Intelligence agencies.

For the bombing of the North, the seminar will focus on the choices and options presented to the President in November 1964 and then on the decision to begin Operation Rolling Thunder in February 1965. For the commitment of U.S. combat troops, the seminar will consider the arguments for an increase in U.S. troops in April 1965 and then on the decision in July to deploy 100,000 men.

Through seminar discussion, a comparison of the various views should lead to a judgment as to why the decisions were taken. In searching for the answer, the seminar can probe deeply to analyze the characteristics of the American policymaking process.

(1) How important to the decisions were the following:

-- the ideas and objectives of American policymakers, i.e., their assessment of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere; of the potential costs to those interests if South Vietnam became a Communist state; and of the potential for Soviet or Chinese actions?

-- the personalities of the major actors? Who dominated the debate? Who was favored in the President's circle?

-- the organizational preference and responsibilities of the various parts of the Executive branch?

(2) In coming to the decision, were all views and options allowed to be expressed and were they considered?

(3) What was the nature of the military advice given the President and the Secretary of Defense? How important was this advice in the decisions that were taken? Would the outcome have been different if the military had played a different role?

(4) What difference do you think it made in the bombing decision that the options of neither George Ball nor the JCS were presented in the final paper for the President?

(5) Who was the most critical actor in the process and why: because of his position, the nature of his recommendations, his personal relationship with the President?

(6) In the final analysis, how well did the policymaking process work?

Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts (The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, pp. 353-4) conclude:

The U.S. political-bureaucratic system did not fail; it worked....American leaders were convinced that they had to prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism, and until May 1975 they succeeded....At each critical juncture the government debate centered on how to contain communism in Vietnam. Decisionmakers perceived the immediate costs of maintaining the commitment, and the President always refused to pay enough of the costs to make clear or quick victory possible, but until the end they always paid the cost of preventing Communist victory....The system facilitated decisionmaking on means to reach the end of containment; the end remained virtually unchallenged within the executive branch....The bureaucratic system did what it was supposed to: select and implement means to a given end. The political system did what a democracy usually does: produce a policy responsive more to the majority and to the center than to the minority or the extremes of opinion. And strategic thought, from that of the limited war theorists to the counterinsurgency specialists, did what it was supposed to do: support the general policy of worldwide containment with specific ideas and programs for containment in Vietnam.

Robert Galluchi (Neither Peace Nor Honor, pp. 133-135) states:

The policymaking process was less open in 1964 and 1965 than it had been in earlier years....Critical decisions about the war, including the bombing of the north, were made at the regular Tuesday lunch meeting of a few top

actors, operating without agenda, minutes, or staff....the fact that the process became closed permits us to account for the persistence of the initial premises about the nature of the conflict held by principal actors....Beyond the initial premises of the policymakers, high level bureaucratic compromise and interaction were a vital part of the process by which the real content of policy was determined....The effect of organizations as units performing in a way consistent with their traditional roles and identities also had an impact on policy, as did the operating procedures and reward structures internal to the organizations.

(7) In a quasi-revolutionary war, can you imagine or expect the American political and bureaucratic system to work any way other than to support incremental intervention?

Topic 9: DOD, the JCS, Congress and Reorganization

Wednesday  
18 December 1985  
1330-1630  
DR

A. General:

This lesson is designed to allow some reflection on the intricate relationship that exists within the Department of Defense between professionals and politicians, particularly regarding their individual goals and the manner in which their goals are achieved. We also look at the source of structural changes for the national security apparatus, the Congress, and some of the more recent discussions and proposals for changes in the structure to overcome identified shortfalls in the "system."

Deep in our U.S. military tradition is the theme that the "civilian" must always maintain "control" over the military. Fear of the General on the white horse charging out to take over the country is the image that is always conveyed to me by those seriously worried by this prospect. But "control" can have many different meanings for different people in our free and democratic system. By analyzing some of the varying concepts for civil-military relationships we discover many problems inherent in trying to institutionalize the "proper" relationship.

The criticisms of the system are extensive and range from the obvious caricature of bloated DOD officials foolishly spending dollars on ineffective or excessive weapons systems (portrayed as toy tanks, airplanes and ships for the senior Generals and Admirals), to a more dramatic attack on the "systems" inability to execute military operations successfully.

B. Issues for Considerations:

1. In giving military advice to the President, should the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider domestic and international politics as well as the economic situation of the nation and the world? Should they consider the budget deficit, the international debt of the third world countries, local opposition such as that to M-X basing schemes, fears of reaction to nuclear weapon deployments overseas and development of nerve gas weapons for examples?

2. Is it wrong for military men to speak out against such things as the War Powers Act or troop reductions in Korea? Or to request shifts in regional military priorities to match regional shifts in economic importance such as that occurring today between the Atlantic and Pacific areas?

3. Of what value is the debate over JCS reform? Will structural changes really make a difference to the Chairman's position as adviser and single spokesman for the military? To the parochialism among military services?

4. Is it possible to have reform within the national security decision-making apparatus that will be institutionalized and accepted by all parties without Congress mandating the reform through legislation?

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5. There has been an explosion in ideas and measures that could or might be implemented to change the "system" to make it more effective. Look closely at some of the recommendations for change. Who are the individuals making the proposals? What positions do or did they hold in the government? What is it about their ideas that are intrinsically sound?

6. Some say that strengthening JCS or replacing it with a "General Staff" will lead to a Prussian-like General Staff "Monster." Is such a fear a "red herring," or does the argument have merit?

C. Required Reading:

1. Betts, Richard K., Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 31-51.

2. Dudney, Robert S., "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?," U.S. News and World Report, February 27, 1984, pp. 35-39.

3. Middleton, Drew, "Movement Builds to Reorganize Joint Chiefs," Air Force Times, April 29, 1985, p. 55.

4. Keller, Bill, "Overhaul is Urged for Top Military," The New York Times, January 22, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, January 22, 1985, pp. 1, 4.

5. Gerstenzang, James, "Major Pentagon Reforms Urged in Study," The Los Angeles Times, February 26, 1985, p. 6. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, February 27, 1985, p. 9.

6. Schlesinger, James R., "Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs," The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 1985, p. 32. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, February 8, 1985, p. 5.

7. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "Streamlining U.S. Military Command Set-up," The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1985, p. 28. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, June 29, 1985, p. 3-F.

8. Anderson, Gary W., "The Military Reformers Prussian Model," The Washington Post, May 21, 1984, p. 19. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, May 21, 1984, p. 7.

9. Halloran, Richard, "Study Assails Move to Strengthen Joint Chiefs," The New York Times, September 23, 1984, p. 38. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, September 24, 1984, pp. 1, 2.

10. Bell, Thomas D., Jr., "The Joint Chiefs Should Remain Joint," The New York Times, March 22, 1985, p. 31. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, March 22, 1985, p. 7.

11. Keller, Bill, "Pentagon Leaders Defend Its System," The New York Times, April 8, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, April 8, 1985, pp. T-2.

12. Lehman, John, "Don't Subject Pentagon to Trendy Whims," The Miami Herald, July 29, 1985, p. 11. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, August 9, 1985, p. 5-F.

**Topic 10: Providing Military Advice and the Role  
of the JCS in National Security Decisionmaking**

Thursday  
19 December 1985  
0830-1130  
LD

**A. General:**

Today we will have an opportunity to view the decisionmaking process through the experience of an individual who has held positions as the Chief of his military service and as the highest level military officer in the United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.) brings a perspective to this issue that is unique, serious, long contemplated and actively proposed. Since his retirement he has been a major stimulus for change to the current JCS organization.

Although changes to the system have occurred in the past through amendments to the basic National Security Act of 1947, it is still felt by many that the system is deficient. Even some who strongly supported a position of no change are beginning to alter their point of view. The Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, seems to be in favor of limited JCS reform which acknowledges that some problems do exist within the current system and there is a possibility that reform to the system may be able to solve them.

The congressional surge of interest continues to heat up as of the writing of this syllabus. Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), has separated himself from Reagan Administration policy and joined with Senator Sam Nunn, senior democrat on the SASC, to push aggressively for change to the current system.

All this having been said, it is difficult to appraise the chances for meaningful reform this legislative year. Although many seem to be in favor of reform and the possibility of a more receptive response by the new Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Crowe, is strong, the recent past has shown that the legislative process is not up to bold initiatives in the area of JCS/DOD reform. Last year, the debate for reform became smothered in larger issues such as the budget and, to date, Congress has been able to only pass legislation containing minor, token changes to the current system.

**B. Issues for Consideration:**

1. The issues listed under Topic 9 continue to apply to this topic. You might at this time try to summarize in your own mind what the major reform proposals are, what meaning they bring to the system, and why you favor or disfavor them.

2. What odds do you place on the possibility of major reform measures being approved by Congress? Why?

3. The JCS are having a difficult time finding consensus on new retirement proposals. Why? Is this to be expected? Is this an issue that the JCS should try to resolve? What difference would an all-powerful Chairman add to the debate?

4. Should the JCS be abolished? If so, what would replace it?

C. Required Readings:

1. Jones, David C., "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 138-149.

2. Mohr, Charles, "The More it Changes, the More it Stays the Same," The New York Times, February 6, 1985, p. 20. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, February 6, 1985, p. 3-F

3. Burgess, Tom, "Navy Secretary Supports Limited JCS Reform," Air Force Times, August 5, 1985, p. 44. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, August 1, 1985, pp. 8F, 9F.

4. Budahn, P.J., "JCS Deadlocked on Retirement," Air Force Times, September 2, 1985, p. 4.

D. Supplementary Reading:

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 15, 1985).



## Topic 11: Contemporary Perspective on National Security Issues

Friday

20 December 1985

1000-1130

L

### A. General:

This lecture and Q&A will be our final session and will seek to do a couple of things. It will first give a contemporary perspective on national security issues as suggested in the topic title. Second, it will provide another opportunity to view a practitioner up close and further investigate that unique attribute of personality in the decisionmaking process.

Alexander Haig has held a number of positions at the highest level of government and has had an opportunity to observe first-hand the workings of the Nixon Administration and the powerful position held by Henry Kissinger plus the beginnings of the Reagan Administration with its turbulence and adjustments. Excerpts from the book Caveat give a flair for the turmoil of those times.

Finally, our last reading returns us to the main theme of our Course and that of Unit IV by way of bringing to a conclusion our consideration of how national security policy is formulated within the Executive Branch and why and how the American policymaking process works.

This ends the first semester of your year at the National War College and we are hopeful that what you have learned will stay with you as a strong background for your upcoming studies of the major regions of the world and foreign policy and national/military strategy development during the second semester. More importantly we hope your insight into the American policymaking process will stay with you and help you throughout the remainder of your government service.

May the holiday season be especially joyful to each of you and your families. Be sure to join together at the NWC Christmas traditional immediately following this session to celebrate.

### B. Required Reading:

a. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 147-163.

b. Haig, Alexander, "CAVEAT: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy," Time Special Section, April 2, 1984, pp. 40-62.

c. Gilman, Stuart C., "Philosophical Challenges and Historical Ironies," The Bureaucrat, Spring 1985, pp. 5-9. Reprinted in Current News, Special Edition, June 12, 1985, pp. 5-9.